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Natural Law and Spontaneous Order 
in the Work of Gary Chartier 
 




Gary Chartier’s 2013 book Anarchy and Legal Order begins with the claim 
that a just society must be rooted in peaceful and voluntary cooperation.2  As the 
title of the book suggests, this claim implies—and the book is designed to 
show—that the just society has a legal order but not coercive political authority. 
In other words, an anarchist society, understood not as one without legal order 
but as one without rulers, should be our ideal. To make a case like this, one needs 
to show that there is an underlying morality that the social order both protects 
and depends on, and that such an order can exist independently of state coercion. 
In this essay, I intend to argue that Chartier does this, without necessarily using 
this language, by skillfully combining insights from two traditions not typically 
associated with one another: natural law theory, e.g. as found in Aquinas and 
Locke, and spontaneous order theory, e.g. as found in Hayek. I will begin with a 
brief sketch of the bridge between these theories, and then elaborate on that by 
showing how Chartier does this in the book.3 
The central theme of the natural law tradition is that there are objective 
moral principles that are accessible to the human intellect but are not the product 
of human creation. This view has antecedents in Plato and Aristotle, is developed 
extensively in Thomas Aquinas and Francisco de Vitoria, and brought to bear on 
practical politics by John Locke. The central theme of spontaneous order theory 
is that while some orders are the result of deliberate, conscious planning, there 
are also orders that arise organically. In social theory we are concerned with the 
subset consisting of those orders that arise as the result of human action but not 
of human design. This idea is a central tenet of the Austrian School economists 
and is extensively developed in the work of Friedrich Hayek. Examples of 
spontaneous orders include: markets, prices in a market, and the 
customary/common law system. 
Let us assume that legal institutions are evolved processes that facilitate 
social living. How can this be reconciled with the natural law idea that moral 
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principles are “out there” waiting to be discovered?  Because common law is 
itself a discovery process—discovering the most felicitous ways to resolve 
disputes and find social forms of life that are conducive to fostering harmony, 
reconciliation, and cooperation. So is the natural law the thing that common law 
discovers?  Possibly. An evolutionary process can be random or teleological. If 
the common law is evolving randomly, there’s no reason to think it’s “heading 
towards” some objective moral reality. But if it’s evolving teleologically, it might 
be. Social institutions do have a telos—facilitating social living.  Just as we might 
defend teleology in ethics on the grounds that human action must be directed in 
the service of human flourishing, so too we might defend teleology in social 
institutions on the grounds that social institutions have a purpose. That they have 
a purpose doesn’t mean that we can deliberately plan them to achieve that 
purpose—this may presuppose greater knowledge than it is possible for a 
planner to have—so we need a discovery process which yields efficacious ways 
of living together that fosters harmony and cooperation, and allows individual 
flourishing in a pluralistic sense, and promotes reconciliation. 
The full picture of natural law theory, from its antecedents in Plato and 
Aristotle, to its reworking by Aquinas and Vitoria, to its practical manifestation 
in Locke, can be seen as something that tries to tie together a theory of human 
nature, a conception of objective justice, and claims about the desirability of 
various social institutions—the latter being a function of the first two. This leads 
to questions about the origins and nature of social order. Natural law theory (I 
am focusing more on Aristotle and Locke than I am on Aquinas, though he is 
not irrelevant) suggests there are better and worse ways to organize society, and 
the principles governing this are rationally justifiable and discoverable by the 
human intellect.4  On this view, law is a discovery process, a discovery of truths 
about human nature and social interaction. The social order should be beneficial: 
one that facilitates human well-being and allows us to live together and flourish.  
In chapter one, Chartier argues that there is such a thing as a “reasonable 
conception of the good life” (2013: 7).  Human welfare, properly understood, is 
not a matter of mere preference-satisfaction, but rather a matter of whether what 
we claim constitutes it actually does provide good reason to choose those things. 
He argues in chapter one that “there are truths about my welfare, or yours, that 
are strongly independent of our preferences” and shows that this implies “living 
well” means “acting reasonably” (2013: 23). This is squarely within the basic 
tenets of a natural law view, and it combines both a claim about objectivity and 
a recognition of human pluralism. These are not at all incompatible. The ethical 
framework we see in Aristotle, i.e. a naturalist moral realism, gives us a way to 
understand human well-being in both its generic (i.e. universal) and 
individualized dimensions. While capturing that which is common to humanity, 
it also recognizes and accounts for the pluralism found in such diverse beings as 
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ourselves. The human psyche is complex enough that no two people are alike in 
tastes and preferences, although the functionality through which goals are 
achieved—rationality and self-direction—are the same for each. The human 
good is plural and agent-relative, although it can be understood within objective 
generic conditions.  There isn’t really “the” human good, other than a social 
order conducive to the many possible (but compossible) human flourishings. 
The classical liberal political theory that arises from this tradition, for example 
Lockean theory (with its self-ownership thesis), finds a robust conception of 
ordered liberty as the social order most conducive to human flourishing—
specifically if understood as a “meta-norm,” a pre-condition for moral activity, a 
precondition for the self-directed development of the person.5   
If the application of practical reason to self-directed action is a necessary 
condition of human flourishing, then a social order will be beneficial to human 
well-being only if, in practical terms, people in that society have a sphere of 
freedom whereby self-directed activity can be exercised without invasion by 
others. This freedom is subject to the compossibility condition in a social setting 
(where we can understand compossibility as maximum equal freedom for all)— 
otherwise conflict is created. It’s not so much that rights are necessary conditions 
of human flourishing, it’s that rights make possible and protect the necessary 
conditions of human flourishing. Rights protect the possibility of self-
directedness in a social setting. Cooperative schemes by which we can jointly 
pursue common ends and greater achievement need facilitation just as peaceful 
individual pursuits do. Thus both our individuality and sociality are protected 
and promoted. Chartier claims that  
 
The point of morality is to acknowledge, in tandem with an awareness of 
the reality and variety of the modes of flourishing and fulfillment, (i) the 
irreducible diversity of those affected by our actions… and at the same 
time, (ii) their common possession of those characteristics that render 
them (equally) morally considerable…. The point of morality is, in short, 
a life lived well. Such a life is a life lived in accordance with reason. (2013: 
40-41)     
 
So a proper understanding of human flourishing reflects both a recognition of 
objective criteria for rightness and the facts of real pluralism in the human 
condition. Chartier takes this to imply that moral principles can “referee conflicts 
among different people’s attempts to flourish” and that this yields a principle of 
nonaggression common to natural law-based classical liberalism (2013: 43). 
One way to think about natural law is “whatever has rational authority, 
independent of contingent interest.”   What would it mean for a claim about the 
social order to have rational authority?  It would mean that the structure or policy 
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being described is efficacious with respect to the final end of the social order. So, 
why do we have society in the first place?  Aristotle famously noted the natural 
sociality of our species, as did Adam Smith. This sociality has at least two distinct 
dimensions. First, there is the role of community and friends for development 
of virtue and the importance of loving relationships in what Chartier calls a life 
well-lived. Second, this sociality also plays a role in promoting prosperity—the 
well-documented advantages of division of labor, specialization and trade, and 
mechanisms for channeling dispersed knowledge. So a reasonable account of 
human flourishing involves economic interdependence in addition to moral 
interdependence. Of course, many have taken this as evidence that we must have 
a state—i.e., centralized coercive authority. Chartier’s point is that such coercion 
is actively detrimental to human flourishing, not least because it interferes with 
the natural mechanisms by which we cooperate peacefully (2013:157-59). 
In any event, given this account of human sociality and its role in human 
flourishing, a claim about the social order would lack rational authority if it were 
detrimental to, rather than conducive to, these ends. Locke, for example, 
recognizes this when he notes that we can’t consent to tyrannical authority—
indeed to any social order the basic structure of which is not respectful of our 
natural liberty.6  But Locke didn’t have the benefit of appealing to the insights of 
classical economists such as Smith and Ricardo. On the model of classical 
economics, if we’re allowed to trade, we can be of greater benefit to each other 
than if we cannot.  But these gains are not the product of human design. They 
are a different kind of order, an organic one. 
Spontaneous order theory suggests that the social order evolves on its 
own, without necessarily being guided by human planning. But is the evolution 
random or teleological?  If it were random, then these really would be 
incompatible ways of understanding social order!  But if it is teleological, then 
the theories are, or at least might be, complementary, and it is not circle-squaring 
to try to reconcile them. This is what I see Chartier as trying to do, and I think 
he is correct: the natural law theory’s conception of social order points in the 
same direction as the organic order arising in spontaneous order theory. Chartier 
argues that an evolved legal order would be a polycentric one, and that this is 
what is required by the natural law conception of human flourishing. Polycentric 
legal orders both instantiate the moral principles Chartier thinks we get from 
natural law, and are in fact the product of evolutionary processes as explained 
by, e.g., Hayek.7 
Hayek distinguishes two senses of order: taxis and cosmos, the former being 
imposed or designed order, and the latter being emergent or spontaneous or 
evolving order. He also distinguishes two senses of law: thesis and nomos. The 
former is the kind of law imposed by the sovereign, in what he describes as top-
down, coercive, process; the latter is evolved, a spontaneously-emerging (or 
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bottom-up) process. Hayek’s example of this is the evolution of the English 
common law and customary law. Other examples include emergent norms for 
property rights in the American west pre-1885, and international merchant law 
in the Middle Ages and Renaissance.8  While thesis reflects primarily the interests 
of the sovereign (or ruling class generally), nomos arises organically out of human 
interaction—the many iterations of people seeking to more effectively 
coordinate their actions and resolve disputes peaceably. The “law” that develops 
organically, nomos, represents cosmos. In the famous example, we see the pencil, 
which requires for its production more information than anyone could possibly 
have, involving hundreds of crafts and skills and such a vastly complex web of 
interaction that it’s hard even to describe, let alone coordinate.9 
But now let us go back to natural-law theory’s view of law as discovery: if 
the nomos is discovering mechanisms of social interaction which produce peace 
and prosperity, i.e. human flourishing, then it is doing what natural law theory 
says it should be doing. Since the spontaneous order arises out of the many 
iterations of people seeking to more effectively coordinate their actions and 
resolve disputes peaceably, then over a long period, greater success is achieved 
despite the appearance of random trial-and-error. Chartier notes in chapter four 
that an imposed order of the sovereign is not only likely to be wrong, but less 
adaptable to new information (2013: 244). Whether teleologically or not, the 
nomos produces institutions that promote peace and prosperity, facilitate 
cooperative ventures, and protect ordered liberty. This is the convergence point 
between the two branches. On node 1, rights protect the possibility of self-
directedness in a social setting, so the “natural law” should come out to be a 
political/legal order in which people can pursue their diverse ends, bounded by 
the compossibility criterion. That looks like a liberal order. On node 2, people’s 
attempts to work out ways of living together result in evolved norms such as 
impartial dispute resolution, legal protection of socially-acknowledged property 
rights, and established and equal enforcement mechanisms. That also looks like 
liberal order. The evolution of the evolved orders isn’t random—it tends towards 
the development of institutions that promote peace and prosperity. That is the 
telos. Our most successful experiments are those that in fact do promote human 
flourishing. State actions are not only inconsistent with the basic morality 
Chartier finds in natural law by being intrinsically aggressive or treating persons 
unequally; they are also not necessary for the production of things like conflict 
resolution and mutual cooperation. Tyrannical societies result in material 
impoverishment and human death and suffering. So Chartier’s argument 
demonstrates not only that natural law theory is compatible with spontaneous 
order theory, but also that what this confluence points to is a voluntary, 
polycentric legal order. The book is thus valuable not only for offering a robust 
defense of polycentrism, but for doing so in a way that ties together two 
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important threads from the liberal tradition, natural law and spontaneous order, 
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